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This article looks at the commercial sex phenomenon and how it has evolved in South Africa. The article evaluates the 
challenges that commercial sex workers face in South Africa and argues that the dignity of sex workers as citizens of South 
Africa are infringed and it would seem that little is being done to protect these sex workers due to the nature of their work. It is 
argued that sex workers are still entitled to the rights enshrined in the Constitution despite the illegality of sex work. It argues 
further that commercial sex work continues to exist in South Africa despite its illegality and it would be prudent to address the 
challenges that encourage sex work as the criminalization of this type of work does not seem to minimize its existence. The 
article examines the case of Kylie v CMMA which has been subject to much debate recently. It also makes a comparative case 
study of Canada and Sweden’s law on sex work, its challenges, methods and laws adopted to curb the practice. Based on this, 
it determines the lessons which South Africa can learn from these two countries regarding criminalization of sex trades.
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1. Introduction 
Historically, commercial sex is not a new phenomenon in South Africa (Varga, 1997). Prior to 1866, apart from legislation 
put in place to control disorderly conduct in public, the authorities did little to interfere with the practice of commercial sex 
work and there appeared to be no public outcries against this practice (Gardner, 2009). Commercial sex work was seen 
as inevitable; a necessary evil to satisfy male desire (Overall, 1992). In 1866, pressure for the legislature to take action 
on commercial sex trade came from the British colonial master when they ( Kantola and Squires, 2004) threatened to 
withdraw troops from Cape Town after more than 13 per cent of their troops were hospitalized for Sexually Transmitted 
Infections (STIs) (Killingray and Omissi, 1999). Until the late 1980s, “the exchange of sexual acts for reward was not 
criminalized although various acts associated with prostitution, including soliciting, living off the earnings of prostitution 
and brothel-keeping, were criminalized” (Pudifin and Bosch, 2012). Pudifin and Bosch (2013) asserted that “In 1988, 
Parliament amended the infamous Immorality Act 23 of 1957 which had criminalized sexual relationship between 
different race groups in apartheid South Africa and renamed the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957.” This is the current law 
that criminalizes sexual offences in South Africa.
The purposes of the Constitutional democratic dispensation in South Africa were to address the past imbalances 
and human rights abuses experienced by different persons under the apartheid government (Mutua, 1997). This included 
the human rights abuses experienced by commercial sex workers in the course of performing their jobs (Bosch and 
Christie, 2007) Accordingly, Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes the Constitution to 
be the supreme law of the Country and establishes a society that is based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human right (Chaskalson, 2000). The significance of the 1996 Constitution is that it extends its protection to 
all citizens living in South Africa. This means that every citizen is equally protected by law and provides for the Bill of 
Rights which is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa (Goldstone, 1997). It enshrines the rights of all people in 
the country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. The state is required to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights by virtue of section 7 of the Constitution (Liebenberg, 2005).
Klare (1998) once remarked that the 1996 Constitution should be interpreted as a transformative Constitution. This 
means that the Constitution should be interpreted comprehensively enough to accommodate changes that take place in 
South Africa. The transformative nature of the Constitution was further explained by Langa (2008) when he stated that: 
769
 E-ISSN 2039-2117 
ISSN 2039-9340        
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 1 
January 2014 
          
“Every nation should deeply consider ways in which the plight of those without a say in the democratic process and with 
little bargaining power in concluding the social contract may be elevated by sympathetic state intervention” (Klare,1998).
Commercial sex work or trade in sex in South Africa is perceived as an illegal activity and the piece of legislation 
that prohibits this practice is the Sexual Offences Act of 1957 (Gardner, 2009). The issue of criminalization of sex work 
has been challenged before the courts on many occasions (S v Jordaan 2002 (6) SA 642) and it raises complex legal, 
social and moral issues (Meyerson, 2004). Section 11 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act provides that a person ('A') who unlawfully and intentionally engages the services of a person 18 years 
or older ('B'), for financial or other reward, favour or compensation to B or to a third person ('C') –for the purpose of 
engaging in a sexual act with B, irrespective of whether the sexual act is committed or not; or by committing a sexual act
with B, is guilty of engaging the sexual services of a person 18 years or older.
Apart from the criminalization of sex work, the definition of employee in terms of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 
1995 has recently been subject to much debate and interpretation (Gauss, 2011). The interpretation of the definition of 
employee has been a matter of scrutiny in the matter of Kylie v CCMA and Others 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC) particularly 
with regard to employees’ right to fair labour practices and the vulnerability of illegal workers (Nevondwe, 2012). 
The definition of an employee interpreted in Kylie v CCMA has brought some far reaching implications for labour 
law (Le Roux, 2010). This case explored whether a sex worker can claim protection against unfair dismissal in terms of 
the LRA, a right enjoyed comprehensively by employees. It is evident that the definition of employee has been subjected 
to this debate and interpretation because the trade of sex is criminalized in South Africa. In comparison, this article will 
look into the recent developments in Canada and Sweden regarding whether to continue to sustain the criminalization or 
to decriminalize the practice or to regulate it.
It is evident that sex work continues to exist in South Africa despite its illegality (Kempadoo, 2003). Against the 
backdrop of this illegal trade, sex workers are vulnerable to all sorts of crimes, ranging from physical abuse from their 
clients and law enforcement officials who take advantage of this vulnerability (Sanders and Campbell, 2007). Sex 
workers often offer law enforcement officials sexual favours in order to escape arrest and prosecution ( Raymond, 2004). 
This is an unlawful exercise of public power against the vulnerable sex workers. In SWEAT v Minister of Safety & 
Security 2009 (6) SA 513 WCC, it was observed that sex workers are often arrested in violation of the principle of legality 
and, secondly, that members of the South African Police Service and the City Police routinely use the powers of arrest 
conferred by the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) 51 of 1977 to arrest sex workers for the ulterior purpose of harassing 
them rather than for the lawful purpose of having them prosecuted (Freedman and Grant, 2010). 
In view of this damning indictment and abuses being perpetrated by the law enforcement agents, South Africa 
should start conversation on how to provide adequate protection for sex workers as citizens of South Africa who are 
entitled to adequate protection of the law (McCarthy et al. 2012). However legalizing this practice will face challenges 
because of the resistance of religious and cultural practices in South Africa (Coovadia et al. 2009).
Whilst sex work remains criminalized, the decision of the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in Kylie case has put clarity 
to the definition and interpretation of the word ‘employee’ but has equally left a vacuum both in the field of labour law and 
criminal law (Gardner, 2009). The cardinal question is what remedy is there for a sex worker who is unfairly dismissed by 
the employer? In terms of section 193(2) of the LRA, in the case of an unfair dismissal the primary remedy is 
reinstatement or re-employment. It is pertinent to point out that an order of reinstatement is the primary remedy for an 
unfair dismissal (de Clark, 1969). However, reinstating a person in illegal employment would not only encourage illegal 
activity but may also constitute an order on the employer to commit a crime (Christiansen, 1975).
The decision in kylie has classified a sex worker as an employee and can thus approach the relevant CCMA or 
Bargaining Council or the Labour Court where the arbitrator or a judge would then have to consider if the sex worker has 
been treated unfairly and what an appropriate remedy would be. This also brings about a valid question, as employees, 
would sex workers be eligible to pay tax and if so would that not be promoting illegal trade using legal means?( Bindman 
and Doezema, 1997). 
2. Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The study conducted a critical analysis of the current laws, policies, regulations and guidelines regulating sex work in 
South Africa and examined the impacts which the decriminalization of sex work will have in the field of labour law in 
South Africa. The study also explored the protection and remedies available to sex workers under the Constitution and as 
employees under the labour law just like other workers.
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3. Insights from the Case of Kylie
In order to address the issues associated with sex work in South Africa, it will be prudent to take stock of facts of the 
case of Kylie. In Kylie v CCMA, (2008) 29 ILJ 1918 (LC), the Labour Appeal Court in Kylie v CCMA & others had to 
grapple with the question of whether the definition of an employee extends to persons engaged in unlawful activities. 
Kylie was employed in a massage parlor as a sex worker; her employer was Michelle Van Zyl (trading under the name 
Brigitte’s). “In 2006, Kylie was informed by her employer that her employment was terminated, apparently without a prior 
hearing. In 2007, Kylie referred the dispute to the CCMA. In the CCMA, the legal question was whether the CCMA had 
jurisdiction to hear the matter in the light of the fact that Kylie had been employed as a sex worker which according to law 
is illegal, therefore her employment was unlawful. The Commissioner handed down a ruling in which she concluded that 
the CCMA did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate on an unfair dismissal in a case of that nature. It was against this ruling 
that Kylie approached the Labour Court for review (Kylie v CCMA, (2008) 29 ILJ 1918 (LC) at para 5 to 9).
The Labour Court has held that the definition of employee in section 213 of the LRA was wide enough to include a 
person whose contract of employment was unenforceable in terms of the common law. Furthermore, the essential 
question was whether ‘as a matter of public policy, courts (and tribunals) by their actions ought to sanction or encourage 
illegal conduct in the context of statutory and constitutional rights’. However, “it was held that a sex worker was not 
entitled to protection against unfair dismissal as provided in terms of section 185(a) of the LRA because it would be 
contrary to a common law principle which had become entrenched in the 1996 Constitution that courts ‘ought not to 
sanction or encourage illegal activity.” (S v Jordaan & Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at para 69). Kylie then referred the 
matter to the LAC which surprisingly overruled the Labour Court’s judgment and found in her favour, to the effect that sex 
workers can now claim protection from the LRA and section 23 of the Constitution, 1996.
3.1 Legal implications of the Judgment
Section 23(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides that “everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” The term ‘everyone’, 
which follows the wording of section 7(1) of the 1996 Constitution which provides that the Bill of Rights enshrines the 
right “of all people in the country”, is supportive of an extremely broad approach to the scope of the right guaranteed in 
the 1996 Constitution (Jordaan, 2009).
This is also addressed in Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para11 where it was 
held that the word ‘everyone’ is a term of general import and unrestricted meaning. It means what it conveys. Once the 
state puts in place a social welfare system, everyone has a right to have access to that system.” (Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) 
SA 383 (LAC), para15).
From its inception, the Constitutional Court has been consistent in this approach. In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC) at paragraph137, it was said that the right to life and dignity ‘vests in every person, including criminals 
convicted of vile crimes. The court further said that these criminals ‘do not forfeit their rights under the 1996 Constitution 
and are entitled, as all in the country now are, to assert these rights, including the right to life, the right to dignity and the 
right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment’ (Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC) at para18).
In Chirwa v Transnet and Others 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) at para 110 the court held that the objects of the LRA are 
not just textual aides to be employed where the language is ambiguous. This is apparent from the interpretive injunction 
in section 3 of the LRA which requires anyone applying the LRA to give effect to its primary objects and the 1996 
Constitution. The primary objects of the LRA must inform the interpretation process and the provisions of the LRA must 
be read in the light of its objects. Thus where a provision of the LRA is capable of more than one plausible interpretation, 
one which advances the objects of the LRA and the other which does not, a court must prefer the one which will 
effectuate the primary objects of the LRA- Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC) at para 15.
The Sexual Offences Act makes brothel keeping a criminal offence and this includes residing in a brothel for 
purposes relating to prostitution activities. In terms of section 20(1) (A) (a) of the Act, unlawful carnal intercourse for 
reward constitutes a criminal offence which attracts a criminal penalty of imprisonment of no more than three years and a 
fine of no more than R6000.
In addition to these provisions there is a common law principle that courts ought not to sanction or encourage 
illegal activity, (Packer, 1968). This principle is now incorporated within the 1996 Constitution entrenched as an element 
of the rule of law, and set out in section 1 of the Constitution, 1996.
The question arises thus as to whether section 23 affords protection to a sex worker. In NEHAWU v UCT (2003) 
24 ILJ 95 (CC) at para 40 the Constitutional Court emphasized that the focus of section 23(1) of the 1996 Constitution 
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was as on the ‘relationship between the worker and the employer and the continuation of that relationship on terms that 
are fair to both’ (Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC) at para 21). That approach followed upon the judgment in SANDU 
v Minister of Defense (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) at paras 28-30 where it was held that even if a person is not employed 
under a contract of employment that does not deny the ‘employee’ all constitutional protection. This conclusion is 
reached despite the fact that they ‘may not be employees in the full contractual sense of the word’ but because their 
employment ‘in many respects mirrors those of people employed under a contract of employment’ (Kylie v CCMA 2010 
(4) SA 383 (LAC) at Para 21). This can also be supported by two decisions of the LAC in which the court ‘approached the 
vexed question of employment relationship on the basis of the substance of the arrangements between the parties as 
opposed to the legal form adopted’(State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Limited v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 2234 
(LAC) at para 10.).
The principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio ‘prohibits the enforcement of immoral or illegal contracts’ (Rautenbach, 
2013.). Thus, if a contract is illegal, courts must regard the contract as void and hence unenforceable (Corbin, 1993). In 
turn, a contract is illegal if it is contrary to public policy and it is against public policy to engage in a contract which is 
contrary to law or morality (Schwartz, 1952). In South African law, adultery and commercial sex are regarded as immoral 
and of such turpitude so as to render an agreement concerning or linked to such morality as void and thus unenforceable 
(Simon-Kerr, 2012).
Even though the contractual relationship between Kylie and her employer was invalid, the question therefore arise 
as to whether a constitutional protection of fair labour practices as enshrined in section 23 of the 1996 Constitution apply 
to a person who would, but for an engagement in illegal employment, enjoy the benefits of this constitutional right.
That question was answered in the negative by the Labour Court, primarily because, were such rights to be 
granted, a court would undermine a fundamental constitutional value of the rule of law by sanctioning or encouraging 
legally prohibited activity. In the view of the learned judge in the court a quo, that conclusion was supported by the 
Constitutional Court in its decision in S v Jordan and others (2002) 6 SA 642 (CC) at para 28 ff. In Kylie, the court said 
that reinstating a person in illegal employment would not only sanction illegal activity but may constitute an order on the 
employer to commit a crime.
Section 23 of the Constitution, 1996 does afford constitutional protection to Kylie. The illegal activity of a sex 
worker does not per se prevent her from enjoying a range of constitutional rights (Hanna, 2000). Even though the 
character of the vocation sex worker undertake devalues their human dignity and respect, they are still human beings 
that need to be accorded protection under the law ( Bonthuys, 2006). This does not mean that as sex workers they are 
stripped of the right to be treated with respect by law enforcement officers (Lopes, 2006). All arrested and accused 
persons including sex workers must be treated with dignity by the police (Goldstein, 1969). However, any invasion of 
dignity, going beyond that ordinarily implied by an arrest or charge that occurs in the course of arrest of incarceration 
cannot be attributed to section 20(1A)(a) but rather to the manner in which it is being enforced. The remedy is not to 
strike down the law but to require that it be applied in a constitutional manner (Waldron, 2011). The fact that a client pays 
for sexual services does not afford the client unlimited license to infringe the dignity of the sex worker (Selala, 2011).
It is also important to bear in mind the fact that the unfair labour practice jurisdiction was introduced to counter the 
arbitrariness of lawfulness, in particular, termination by lawful notice ( Le Roux, 2009). Furthermore, as suggested earlier,
it is conceivable that a labour practice may well impact on the position of either prospective or retired employees. For 
these reasons, and in the absence of an internal limitation clause, it is suggested that labour practices in s 23(1) ought to
be approached dispassionately and be given a broad construction. An act of terminating employment, the structuring of 
working hours, or discipline at work remain labour practices, irrespective of whether they are done in the context of legal 
or illegal work ( Le Roux, 2009).
Selala 2011 eloquently asserts that “sex workers cannot be stripped off their right to be treated with dignity by their 
clients, it must follow that, in their other relationship namely with their employers, the same protection should hold. It 
should be recognized that they must be treated with dignity not only by their customers but by their employers according 
to section 23 of the Constitution, 1996 which, at its core, protects the dignity of those in an employment relationship.”
Without an iota of doubt, the Labour Appeal Court’s decision that Kylie meets the threshold requirement so that 
she is a beneficiary of the applicable constitutional rights is a good decision to that extent only. The next issue now is to
consider whether she is entitled to any legal relief. In refusing to recognize the possibility of a remedy in terms of the 
LRA, the Labour Court based its decision on the view that the legislature intended that the Act not only penalized 
prohibited activity but precluded courts from recognizing any rights or claims arising from that activity. In terms of this 
approach, where courts recognize a claim based on ‘a constitutional right’ that court would be sanctioning or encouraging 
the prohibited activity’. Whereas, the court in Kylie observed that “foreign and child workers, who are prohibited from 
772
 E-ISSN 2039-2117 
ISSN 2039-9340        
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 1 
January 2014 
          
assuming certain forms of employment, can be afforded protection because the prohibition is aimed at ‘who does the job 
rather than the job itself’, the prohibition with regard to sex work concerns the nature of the job.” 
Even though sex workers are vulnerable to exploitation, such protection ‘will mean sanctioning and encouraging 
activities that the legislature has constitutionally decided should be prohibited’ (Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC) at 
Para 29). In general, South African law takes the view that an illegal contract is void and that the illegality arises when a 
contract’s conclusion, performance or object is expressly or impliedly prohibited by legislation or is contrary to good 
morals or public policy (MacQueen, 2010). In Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989(1) SA 1(A) the court held that the principles 
underlying contracts contrary to public policy and contra bones mores may overlap.
Generally, where performance had been made in terms of an illegal contract, a court will also not assist a party 
who has performed to recover his or her performance by the use of an enrichment based remedy (Strong, 1960). 
However, the courts have acknowledged that they have an equitable discretion to relax the operation of the so called par 
delictum rule in order to allow one party utilize an enrichment based remedy, an approach which is sourced back to 
Jajbhay v Cassiem 1939 AD 537. In this case, the Appellate Division held that the court should relax the rule if it was 
necessary ‘to prevent injustice or to satisfy the requirements of public policy’. Our law is not wholly inflexible in its refusal 
to relax the par delictum rule. The criminalization of prostitution does not necessarily deny to a sex worker, the protection 
of the Constitution, 1996 and, in particular section 23(1) thereof, and by extension its legislative implementation in the 
form of the LRA.
The LRA came into effect as a result of section 23 of the Constitution, 1996 which affords everyone the right to fair 
labour practices. The purpose of the LRA ‘is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratization of the work place. The LRA was designed to ensure that the dignity of all workers should be respected 
and that the workplace should be predicated upon principles of social justice, equality and fairness (NEHAWU v UCT 
2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at 33-40).
If the purpose of the LRA was to achieve these noble goals, then courts have to be very vigilant to safeguard those 
employees who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation in that they are inherently economically and socially weaker 
than their employers. This consideration applied with even greater force in the case of sex workers who are especially 
vulnerable class exposed to exploitation and abuse by a range of people with whom they interact, including their 
employers and clients.
The United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressly 
condemns the exploitation of women. In addition, paragraph 5 of the ILO’s Employment Relationship Recommendation 
R198 of 15 June 2006 requires member states to take particular account in national policy of the need to ensure the 
effective protection of workers ‘especially those affected by the uncertainty as to the existence of an employment 
relationship, including female workers, as well as the most vulnerable workers, young workers, older workers, workers in 
the informal economy, migrant workers and workers with disabilities.’
In South Africa, many sex workers are particularly vulnerable and are exposed to exploitation and vicious abuse 
(Higson-Smith and Richter 2004). The court said “it may be that this categorization is not applicable to all cases of sex 
workers but no matter how it is perceived, there is no doubt that Kylie falls within such a vulnerable category.” 
Consequently, Kylie was an employee for the purposes of the LRA and all the rights and entitlements in it should benefit 
her.
In defending the rights and dignity of a sex worker, the court also emphatically said that “in the circumstances, 
where a sex worker forms part of a vulnerable class by the nature of the work that she performs, the position she holds 
and as a result becomes subject to potential exploitation, abuse and assaults on her dignity, there is, on the basis of the 
finding in this judgment, no principled reason by which she should not be entitled to some constitutional protection 
designed to protect her dignity and which protection by extension has now been operationalized in the LRA.”
The court emphasized the need to consider the impact of a broad based constitutional protection and the 
preservation of the dignity of vulnerable persons in so exercising discretion to decide that such an employment 
relationship holds some implications for the parties to the relationship.
In stating why the constitution has come to address the inequalities and injustices of the past racial apartheid and 
colonial past, the court vehemently and eloquently said that “the Constitution’s commitment to freedom, equality, dignity 
and its concern to protect the vulnerable, exploited and powerless should always be encouraged. The 1996 Constitution 
reflects the long history of brutal exploitation of the politically weak, economically vulnerable and socially exploited during 
three hundred years of racist and sexist rule.”
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3.2 The implications of the case on labour relations
This case also clarifies the role played by a contract of employment in the modern employment relations, which 
addresses a question of whether a contract concluded on illegal activities or a contract concluded by an illegal immigrant 
or a person with a doubtful status, can be enforceable under the labour protective legislation and the Constitution before 
courts (LeRoux, 2009).
The issue is whether there is a valid employment relationship as opposed to whether the contract is valid or not. 
This is what the court will establish first before delving to the issue of whether the contract is valid or not (Dau-Schmidt 
and Haley, 2006). In Rumbles v Kwa Bat Marketing (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ (LC), the court stated that what is required in 
determining whether a worker is an employee is a conspectus of all relevant facts including any contractual terms and 
determination whether these holistically viewed established a relationship of employment as contemplated by the 
statutory definition.
This approach is in line with the findings of the LAC in Kylie. It also finds proponents from Chipenete v Carmen 
Electrical CC & another 1998) 19 ILJ (LAC). The notable difference between this case and Kylie is that this case dealt 
with the ‘illegality’ in terms of status of the claimant within the country whereas Kylie and other cases dealt with the 
illegality of the work itself. Chipenete, a Mozambican national, was an illegal immigrant, in that his presence in South 
Africa was not authorized in terms of the then Aliens Act. He had applied to the Industrial Court and had been granted a 
status quo order in terms of section 43 of the then LRA of 1956. On presenting himself for reinstatement, he was arrested 
at the behest of his employer for being an illegal alien, imprisoned and released on paying police fine of R100. Although 
the court noted the ‘illegality’ in status of claimant, it ruled that it was not relevant to the core issues and as such 
collateral issue over which court had no jurisdiction, hence parties were in employment relationship. Court held to be 
more concerned with conferring legal remedies for unfair discrimination and exploitation of foreigners in deterring 
employers rather than for employing aliens with no valid permits (Bosch and Christie, 2007).
The recent case which dealt with similar facts to Chipenete is that of Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 
1480 (LC). In this case, the Labour Court dealt with a case where the employer had employed Mr German Lanzetta, an 
Argentinean national, who was in South Africa on a temporary residence permit. Mr Lanzetta’s employment with
Discovery Health Ltd was terminated summarily on the 14th January, 2006 when the employer realized that he did not 
have a valid work permit. Mr Lanzetta then referred an unfair dismissal claim to the CCMA which ruled that he was an 
employee in terms of the LRA. On review, the Labour Court upheld the findings of the CCMA, evincing that ‘…because a 
contract of employment is not the sole ticket for admission into the golden circle reserved for employees.’ The judgment 
in Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA serves to demonstrate clearly that establishing the existence of an employment 
relationship transcends finding contract of employment and that the invalidity of a contract does not automatically 
invalidate the employment relationship (Bosch, 2006). This therefore is in concord with the findings of both the Labour 
Court and Labour Appeal Court that it was not in dispute that Kylie was an ‘employee’, necessarily because an 
employment relationship was established, inconsiderate of the nature of the work involved or the validity of whatever 
employment contract which might have existed between them.
In South African Broadcasting Corporation v Mckenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585, the LAC held that the definition of an 
employee in fact refers to a person working for another in terms of contract of employment. This attempt by the Labour 
Appeal Court to transcend the realities of employment, that is the nature of employment relationship, with contract of 
employment, a valid one for that matter, proved controversial. This is considerate of the old judgment in Adampol (Pty) 
Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1989 (3) SA 800 (A) wherein it was held that words of statute must be given their ordinary, 
literal and grammatical meaning where words appear clear and unambiguous. It is submitted therefore that, in handing 
down the Kylie judgment, the LAC took this into consideration. Hence, it is asserted that similar approach should be 
adopted when dealing with a situation of workers purged into the informal sector as these workers experience varying 
patterns of insecurities and exploitations.
In Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele & Others (2005) 6 BLLR 523 (LAC), it was held that even a person who has 
concluded a contract but have not yet commenced work is nevertheless an employee for purposes of LRA. Du Toit 
(2006:74) argues that this is considerate of the fact that such people need the special attention of labour laws due to their 
vulnerability arising from, for instance, economic dependence on the employer and further that the purpose of the 
definition is to identify those categories of persons to whom such protection should be extended. This we opine will play a 
significant role in the effective extension of protection to the majority of workforce in the informal sector, considerate of
the matrix of different forms of work and the absence of security associated with these, characterized by a dire lack of 
legal protection.
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The issue of illegality also arose in SITA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC). This judgment 
strengthened a tack that determining who an employee is in the contemporary world of work, should be through 
establishing the existence of employment relationship rather than a valid contract of employment. Therefore, an 
employee who worked for the front company of the South African Defence Force ( SANDF) as retrenched and given 
severance package in terms of which he could not be employed again by the defence force. He continued serving the 
defence force through a close corporation. The defence force cancelled the project as a result of lack of funding and the 
employee was effectively dismissed. He instituted a claim of unfair dismissal. The court had to determine the identity of 
the true employer; whether it was the defence force or the close corporation. With reference to Denel v Gerber (Pty) Ltd,
the court did not concern itself with the existence of a contract of employment but held that an employment relationship 
was established between an employee and the defence force and ordered payment for compensation. 
4. Lessons from Other Countries
4.1 Canada
The case of Bedford v Canada 2010 ONSC 4264 demonstrates the tension that exists around the moral, social and 
historical perspectives on the issue of prostitution and the effect of certain criminal law provisions on the constitutional 
rights of those affected. Prostitution is not illegal in Canada (Duchesne, 1997). However, Parliament has seen fit to 
criminalize most aspects of prostitution (Barnett and Nicol, 2008.). The applicants did not challenge all of the prostitution-
related provisions in the Criminal Code. The provisions relating to living on the avails of a person under the age of 18 and 
obtaining sexual services from a person under the age of 18 was not challenged by the applicant, but only challenged ss. 
210, 212(1)(j), and 213(1)(c) of the Criminal code. These provisions relate to adult prostitution. 
The impugned read as follows:
“Section 210(1) of the Criminal code provides that everyone who keeps a common bawdy-house is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
(2) Everyone who;
(a) is an inmate of a common bawdy-house,
(b) is found, without lawful excuse, in a common bawdy-house, or
(c) as owner, landlord, lessor, tenant, occupier, agent or otherwise having charge or control of any place, 
knowingly permits the place or any part thereof to be let or used for the purposes of a common bawdy-house,
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction
(3) Where a person is convicted of an offence under subsection (1), the court shall cause a notice of the conviction 
to be served on the owner, landlord or lessor of the place in respect of which the person is convicted or his agent, and 
the notice shall contain a statement to the effect that it is being served pursuant to this section.
(4) Where a person on whom a notice is served under subsection (3) fails forthwith to exercise any righ,t he may 
have to determine the tenancy or right of occupation of the person so convicted, and thereafter any person is convicted 
of an offence under subsection (1) in respect of the same premises, the person on whom the notice was served shall be 
deemed to have committed an offence under subsection (1) unless he proves that he has taken all reasonable steps to 
prevent the recurrence of the offence.
Section 212 (1)(j) Everyone who lives wholly or in part on the avails of prostitution of another person, is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.
Section 213 (1)(c) Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view stops or attempts to stop 
any person or in any manner communicates or attempts to communicate with any person for the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.”
It was contended that the provisions at issue:
(a) Limit the places and ways in which prostitution can be practiced. It can also lower the risk of violence, (Bedford 
v. Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 at Para 125) (b) Sustain stigmatization of prostitutes and prostitution (Bedford v. Canada, 
2010) and (c) Create a conflicting victim/criminal status in the eyes of the police, which leads many prostitutes to believe 
that the police are not willing to protect them (Bedford v. Canada, 2010).
Thus the applicants further argued that safer ways to conduct prostitution are criminalized, whereas riskier ways 
are not. For example, the applicants’ experts tended to agree that working in-call is the safest way to conduct prostitution; 
however, it is illegal due to the bawdy-house provisions. Working outcall can be done without violating the law, but 
carries its own set of risks (Bedford v. Canada, 2010).
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At the core of these contentions lies section 7 of the Charter which provides that: Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.
And also Section 2(b) which states that:
“Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: Freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication.” 
The Court concluded that the applicants have proven on a balance of probabilities that the impugned provisions 
infringes the Charter rights of the applicants and that there was no demonstration that the infringement of those rights is 
justified. 
4.2 Sweden
After decades of decriminalization, Sweden introduced a unique legal response to prostitution in 1999. The Act on 
Violence Against Women 1999, 1 January 1999, criminalized buying sex and pimping, while the selling of sex by 
prostitutes remains legal (Scoular, 2011). Promoting or encouraging casual sexual relationships for commercial services 
can be punished by up to eight years imprisonment where significant exploitation is present (Scoular, 2011). State-run 
exit programs are accompanied by poverty-reduction measures aimed at women in order to prevent their entry into the 
sex trade (Bedford v. Canada, 2010). The number of women in street prostitution in Sweden has decreased from 650 in 
1999 to less than 500 in 2002 (Ekberg, 2004). Government reports suggest that there are almost no foreign women left in 
street prostitution, and there is some suggestion that human traffickers may now find Sweden to be an unattractive 
destination for trafficked women (Ekberg, 2004).
The legal change has been accompanied by activities targeting male demand for prostitution including a 
nationwide poster campaign raising awareness about prostitution and trafficking in women (Bedford v. Canada, 2010, at 
para 208). Additional educational programs have been established for police personnel to increase their understanding of 
the conditions that make women vulnerable to becoming victims of prostitution and trafficking (Lederer, 2010). According 
to the government fact sheet, after this program began in 2003, complaints that the law was difficult to enforce ceased 
and there was a 300 per cent increase in arrests (Bedford v. Canada, 2010, at para 208). Convictions however remain 
rare. The law applies equally to Swedish peacekeeping forces stationed abroad; in 2002, three Swedish soldiers 
stationed in Kosovo who were found with prostitutes were arrested and discharged from the military (Bedford v. Canada, 
2010, at para 208).
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
The issue of criminalizing or decriminalizing of sex work is indeed a huge challenge as it has the propensity of affecting 
other legislations and therefore requires better interpretation or amendment in order to cater for the transformative 
society. The criminalization of sex work does not in itself reduce the rate at which it is being practiced. Perhaps the 
factors that encourage sex work should be addressed in a similar approach to what was implemented in Sweden in order 
to reduce this practice, The suggested approach may include poverty eradication and implementations of educational 
programmes. 
In Sweden, it appears that there were too many arrests of sex workers than their actual conviction. This is also the 
case in South Africa. Those who are supposed to arrest sex workers usually compromise their positions by patronizing 
them instead thus becoming part of the problem instead of solution. It is therefore recommended that harsher sanctions 
should be imposed on law enforcement officials who arrest sex workers for other ulterior motives. 
The findings of the LAC in Kylie were not correct in maintaining that its judgment cannot and do not sanctions sex 
work. We opine that by affording a sex worker protection, it simply means that one can go to the extent of giving a relief. 
However, the fact that prostitution is rendered illegal does not, for the reasons destroy all the constitutional protection 
which may be enjoyed by someone as Kylie, a sex worker. After all, Kylie is a human being who is also entitled to 
constitutional protection in the Bill of Rights.
The sex worker’s dignity should not to be exploited or abused. This remains intact and the concomitant 
constitutional protection must be available to her as it would to any person whose dignity is attacked unfairly. By 
extension from section 23(1), the LRA ensures that an employer respects these rights within the context of an 
employment relationship. However each case will have to be decided in terms of the facts thereof.
Not all persons who are in an employment relationship which is prohibited by law will enjoy a remedy in terms of 
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the LRA. In so deciding, a tribunal or court is engaged with the weighing of principles; on the one hand the ex turpi causa
rule which prohibits enforcement of illegal contracts and on the other public policy sourced in the values of the 
Constitution, 1996, which, in this context, promotes a society based on freedom, equality and dignity and hence care, 
compassion and respect for all members of the community.
The remaining questions which one can ask oneself is does the LRA afford legal remedy to contracts tainted with 
illegality? If so, to what extent? By ordering reinstatement or reemployment, are we not licensing someone to further 
continue committing such a crime? By awarding compensation are we not paying someone for committing a crime? The 
interpretation of the LAC to classify Kylie as an employee does create a good jurisprudence in the South African Labour 
Law.
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